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Abstract
Sandia has an extensive background in cybersecurity research
and is currently extending its state-of-the-art modeling via
emulation capability. However, a key part of Sandia’s mod-
eling methodology is the discovery and specification of the
information-system under study, and the ability to recreate
that specification with the highest fidelity possible in order to
extrapolate meaningful results.
This work details a method to conduct information sys-
tem discovery and develop tools to enable the creation of
high-fidelity emulation models that can be used to enable
assessment of our infrastructure information system security
posture and potential system impacts that could result from
cyber threats. The outcome are a set of tools and techniques
to go from network discovery of operational systems to emu-
lating complex systems.
As a concrete usecase, we have applied these tools and
techniques at Supercomputing 2016 to model SCinet, the
world’s largest research network. This model includes five
routers and nearly 10,000 endpoints which we have launched
in our emulation platform.
1 Introduction
Our Nation’s critical infrastructure depends on distributed in-
formation systems, which must be resilient against malicious
attempts to disrupt their operation. Security mechanisms must
be deployed and continuously assessed in order to prevent
adversaries from disrupting critical infrastructure. These in-
formation systems employ a broad range of technologies in-
cluding fixed Ethernet, point-to-point wireless, and cellular
communications. Additionally, these systems employ enter-
prise architectures, cloud based data centers, and emergency
response wireless architectures. With the extensive reliance
of critical infrastructure on secure information systems, tech-
niques and mechanisms to assess security must be created.
Assessing the security posture of information systems used
in critical infrastructures necessitates, in cases, the capabil-
ity to assess security on a representation of the operational
system. Performing security analysis on real operational sys-
tems, in most cases, is prohibitive and assessing security on
simulated systems lacks fidelity. A cost-effective solution is
to create an emulation of the system and its components to
enable system-level analysis. An emulated system model can
be used to conduct red teams and assess risks and vulnerabili-
ties of a system. A major challenge in creating an emulated
system model is obtaining an accurate specification of the
system of interest.
Initially security practitioners may examine original sys-
tem design and specification documents, if available. This
typically results in a poor description and specification of
the system since the system has been modified for several
possible reasons:
• Original specification was modified during original de-
ployment
• Device configurations not completely specified and/or
modified over time
• Original device firmware and/or software upgraded
• Original system topology modified for system growth
• Device selection changes resulting from vendor perfor-
mance improvements
In order to obtain an up-to-date and accurate view of the
information system a dynamic system discovery and mapping
capability must be developed and employed. The capability
developed here enables system analysts to diagram, inventory,
audit, and analyze the system of interest. Our solution encom-
passes two areas: System Discovery and System Emulation.
We have developed an information system discovery plat-
form that can be used as a centralized discovery station. The
platform accounts both for application (and service represen-
tation) as well as network configuration. System discovery
in critical infrastructure systems can pose a significant chal-
lenge because of the diversity of devices not normally used in
traditional corporate IT systems. System devices may include
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embedded devices that do not respond to traditional discov-
ery techniques and discovery might be limited to network
protocol scanning mechanisms.
Our developed capability fuses data from both commercial
and open-source solutions. We can employ both active device
discovery and mapping techniques along with passive discov-
ery techniques to discover and create maps of information
systems of interest.
The contributions of this work are as follows: we present
the discovery toolset1 and associated intermediate representa-
tion (IR) as a means to automate the map-to-model process
and apply the toolset to the Supercomputing 2016 network
(SCinet) to demonstrate its utility (shown in Figure 1).
2 Background
Sandia has a long history in large-scale network emula-
tion [21] using virtual machines (VMs). Specifically, Sandia
has developed minimega2, an open-source VM orchestration
tool. minimega supports Sandia’s Emulytics3 program that
combines large-scale network emulation with data analytics.
minimega is fast, easy to deploy, and can scale to run
on massive clusters with virtually no setup. minimega uses
QEMU/KVM [1,9] to launch VMs (which can run unmodified
Windows and Linux operating system). These VMs can be
configured to have different resource allocations (e.g., VCPUs
and memory) and properties (e.g., disk images, number of se-
rial ports). For higher density, minimega also includes support
for lightweight virtualization using Linux containers. Impor-
tantly, minimega uses Open vSwitch [15] to connect these
VMs and containers using virtual switches to create arbitrary
network topologies according to the user’s specifications.
Once configured, minimega includes many capabilities to
launch and manage the VMs and containers (simply referred
to as VMs here). minimega has a scheduler that launches
the VMs across a cluster of machines to evenly distribute
resource allocations. Once launched, minimega has APIs to
start, pause, and kill VMs as well as inspect their current state.
minimega also has a command-and-control system that talks
to agents running within the VMs to send and receive files
and execute commands. For example, this can be used to
start traffic generation and then pull the log files for analysis.
Additionally, minimega has APIs to configure and deploy
routers based on BIRD [7]. These routers provide routing,
DNS, and DHCP for the VMs. Finally, minimega has APIs to
record traffic from the VM networks for further analysis.
These capabilities allow experimenters to build complex
networks of VMs and conduct tests with minimega. How-
ever, the output quality of these emulations is bounded by the
quality of the input system specification.
1Available at https://github.com/sandia-minimega/discovery
2http://minimega.org
3https://www.sandia.gov/emulytics/
3 Related Work
Many tools have been built to date for network discovery.
Tools can generally be divided into two categories: topology
and endpoint discovery. Topology discovery tools try to deter-
mine the structure of the network while endpoint discovery
tools provide detailed information about individual endpoints.
These tools can be further categorized into active tools, when
the tool is allowed to probe the network, and passive tools,
when they are not.
Traceroute [11] is an example of an active tool that has
been used to infer network topologies. Traceroute enumerates
the routing path between a source and destination. Many tech-
niques have been developed on top of traceroute to construct
a topology from the paths [8, 12, 20]. Nmap [13] is an active
scanning tool to enumerate properties of endpoints. Nmap can
discover operating systems, open ports, and sometimes ver-
sions for applications listening on those open ports. In order
to do so, Nmap generates many probes that may be blocked
by firewalls. There are other, passive, tools that provide situa-
tional awareness built on top of NetFlow [3, 22]. These tools
can be used for both topology and endpoint discovery.
These network discovery tools are all complementary to
our system – we envision our system ingesting output from
any and all these tools to build a detailed and rich model of
the network. In fact, we prefer to use these other tools and
write parsers for their outputs rather than implement the full
tool ourselves. This simplifies our development and allows us
to leverage the decades of development that have gone into
these other tools.
Mirkovic et al. [14] present Distributed Experiment Work-
flows (DEW) which describes experiment topology as well
as experiment behavior and topological constraints. Our ap-
proach could be combined with DEW to allow researchers to
define experiments on automatically discovered topologies.
In addition to Sandia’s minimega, there are other emula-
tion platforms such as DETER [2], Emulab [10], and Cloud-
Lab [19]. Each of the emulation platforms have their own
set of design principles and goals and could have been used
instead of minimega. Fortunately, the majority of the discov-
ery toolset is platform agnostic. The final step which emits
minimega commands could be replaced with a separate tool
that automates the APIs of these other platform.
Depending the application of the network model, full-
system emulation may not be necessary. In which case, tools
like mininet [5], which is a tool for software-defined network
developers to prototype large networks on a single computer
using lightweight virtualization, may be appropriate.
4 Methodology
There are two key aspects involved in this work. First, to
investigate methods for rapid, automated, and flexible net-
work structure and behavior specification (raw data to map).
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Figure 1: Model of SCinet 2016, omitting the two largest subnets: the wireless network and the classrooms. The aggregation
routers in the bottom left connect all the vendor machines to the conference network.
This effort required studying issues both in data transforms
appropriate for an Emulytics environment, but also issues in
composing data in constructive ways. Second, given a suit-
able representation of a network, create a mechanism to emit
Emulytics models with variable levels of abstraction suitable
for operators to create, adjust, and analyze.
4.1 Rapid, automated, flexible network speci-
fication (raw data to map)
The overall goal of this work is to investigate mechanisms
to create Emulytics models from source data (e.g., network
packet capture, active network scans, router configurations).
We decouple this operation into transforming sensor data into
an intermediate representation and then transliterating the
intermediate representation into an Emulytics model. This is
not unlike the process most code compilers use – take human
readable source, transform into an intermediate representation
(parse tree), make optimizations, transform into machine code
or other representations. By creating an intermediate repre-
sentation, we create opportunities to perform analyses on the
specification such as identifying partitions in the network, as
well as create a portable and reusable specification for the
model generator to create multiple models from.
The intermediate representation (IR) is a simple graph, with
unstructured key/value pairs on each node (i.e., an endpoint
or switch in a network), as well as unstructured key/value
pairs on each edge (i.e., a network connection). Nodes and
edges are populated with descriptive data about their role and
operation on a network (e.g., IP and MAC address, running
services, hostname).
We have created a number of parsers for a variety of source
data types that can interact with the data already in the graph.
For example, when parsing network packet capture data, the
parser may find that a node with IP address 10.0.0.1 is commu-
nicating to a specific web server. To capture this behavioral ar-
tifact, the parser searches the graph for a node with IP 10.0.0.1.
If it finds one, it adds this metadata to the node specification
(perhaps incrementing a total byte count of traffic as well).
If the node does not exist, it simply creates one, attaching it
to the correct subnet (assuming that it can be inferred), and
moves to the next packet. Using this model, we support both
creating any number of discrete parsers and provide a path
to transliterate data from existing commercial or open source
tools (by modifying those tools or creating “shim” parsers).
The host IR also enables us to automatically perform “gap”
analysis before emitting an Emulytics model. Continuing
with the above example, a compiler is able to perform certain
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checks on the IR of software such as ensuring that certain se-
mantics are met such as that variables are defined before they
are used. We envision performing similar semantic checks on
the host IR. For example, it would be syntactically valid to de-
fine a machine with thousands of interfaces in our host IR but
such a machine would be physically unrealizable and, thus, a
semantic checker of the host IR would reject it as invalid and
suggest potential alternatives.
Likewise, we could encode the best practices of networking
engineers as semantic checkers. These semantic checkers
could also identify blind spots in the network where it can
identify the host IR is incomplete. Without an IR, such checks
would not be feasible.
4.2 Tunable model specification (map to
model)
The second stage of creating an Emulytics model from source
data is to generate a model from a suitable IR that has been
created, optimized, and validated. For the purposes of this
project, we assume that we have sufficient data in the inter-
mediate representation to create a bootable Emulytics experi-
ment (i.e., all endpoints have IP addresses or are configured
for DHCP). The primary goal of the map-to-model stage is to
support translating the IR to an Emulytics model. This stage
also allows for tuning the translation to support emitting vari-
ations of the model. For example, the IR may be comprised
of 250,000 Windows-based endpoints. This is too many Win-
dows virtual machines to boot on most clusters. Instead, the
operator should be able to identify that only some subsection
of endpoints are important to a given experiment and need to
actually run Windows virtual machines. The rest of the model
may safely be made up of generic Linux containers, which
allow for greater density, without impacting the validity of the
experiment. This specification abstraction does not modify
the source IR, simply the generated model, meaning that the
operator can revisit the intermediate representation with new
model criteria for other experiments.
5 Implementation
We built the discovery toolset to integrate into the existing
minimega ecosystem. As such, all of the tools are imple-
mented in Go. discovery is the main tool in the toolset. It acts
as the central tool which all other tools, parsers, model genera-
tors, etc. communicate with, and stores the IR of experiments,
as well as other configuration data. In addition to storing the
IR, the discovery tool also hosts a simple web server that
provides a real-time visualization of the experiment (as seen
in Figure 1 and Figure 4). Figure 2 shows an overview of the
toolset’s interactions.
The discovery tool maintains a single IR at runtime, and
supports a simple JSON-encoded RESTful interface for
queries and updates. The tool can read and write experiments
to disk as well. Figure 3 shows an example of JSON encoded
data for a single node in the IR. Node and edge data is stored
in unstructured maps that are later parsed by the model gener-
ator. Each node and network can by referenced by its ID.
The tool also maintains a simple map of configuration data,
intended to be used to store information about model specific
details, such as the location of disk images that will be used
by an experiment.
5.1 Parsers
We developed several parsers for the output from existing
tools including nmap and traceroute. We also develop a new
PCAP parser based on GoPacket4.
For nmap, we walk the XML output from the tool and cre-
ate an endpoint for each host that nmap identifies, storing the
identified operating system and open ports in the metadata.
Our implementation of this parser assumes that the structure
of the network is already known – all routers and their con-
nected subnets are already represented in the IR.
For traceroute, we parse the hop-by-hop output and cre-
ate an endpoint for each hop. This demonstrates the basic
concept but has a number of shortcomings including alias
resolution and determining the IPs for “backward” edges.
These shortcomings could be addressed by incorporating prior
work [8, 12, 20].
We implement our own PCAP parser to perform passive
endpoint discovery and record the results in the IR. Specifi-
cally, we parse packets using GoPacket, and extract informa-
tion from ARP, Multicast DNS, DHCP, ICMPv4, and TCP
SYN packets.
ARP [16] is used by endpoints to identify the hardware
address associated with a network address. The ARP Replies
are recorded in the IR, creating new endpoints if the IR does
not already contain a given hardware or network address.
Multicast DNS [4] is a service discovery protocol used in
local networks. By snooping on multicast DNS packets, our
PCAP parser can identify which services are available on the
network as well as the IP addresses of the endpoints and store
these in the IR.
DHCP [6] is a network bootstrapping protocol that allows
endpoints to exchange configuration, including which net-
work address to use. Our PCAP parser uses these to create or
update endpoints in the IR, based on hardware address, with
their assigned network addresses.
ICMP [17] is a protocol that is used for network status
messages and diagnostics. Our parser creates new endpoints
based on echo and echo reply messages.
TCP SYN [18] is the first packet in a TCP connection that
includes many parameters for the connection. Previous work
has shown that the TCP parameters are operating system de-
pendent which can be fingerprinted (implemented in p0f [23]).
4https://github.com/google/gopacket
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Figure 2: Overview of the discovery toolset. The discovery daemon accepts input from raw data parsers to build the IR. IR tools
may then check and refine the IR before minemiter creates a minimega script.
{
"NID": 1,
"Edges": [
{
"N": 63,
"D": {
"ip": "10.0.0.1/24",
"mac": "de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe"
}
}
],
"D": {
"hostname": "irc.example.com",
"os": "linux",
"ports": "22,6667"
}
}
Figure 3: Synthetic IR for a generic Linux server that runs
SSH and IRC servers and is connected to a single network
with a static IP.
We ported p0f to Go and to run on top of GoPacket so that
our PCAP parser could annotate endpoints with its suspected
operating system.
Our PCAP parser combines data from these various proto-
cols to create endpoints and populate their metadata. There are
many inconsistencies that can occur passively monitoring a
live network. Our default behavior is to drop inconsistent end-
points. In future work, developing a more rigorous approach
to resolving inconsistencies would substantially improve the
quality of the generate IR.
5.2 minemiter
minemiter is the model generation tool for the discovery IR.
It walks the IR, invoking one or more templates for every
node in the graph, and emits a minimega script that can then
be used to boot the model. The core feature of minemiter is
its use of user definable templates (based on Go’s template
package5) to provide actions on qualities of endpoints. For
example, a node in the IR may have a network connection on
network 63, and a MAC address of de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe, as is
shown in Figure 3. From this, a templated action to generate
the necessary minimega command could look like:
{{ if $e.D.mac }}
vm config net network-{{$e.N}},{{$e.D.mac}}
{{ end }}
This production would generate the valid minimega com-
mand:
vm config net network-63,de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe
Templates are executed in sorted-name order, and mine-
miter expects template names to begin with a single letter
(A-Z) and a two-digit number, such as S70network.template.
5https://golang.org/pkg/text/template
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Using this scheme, minemiter will execute every “A” tem-
plate in numeric order against every node in the IR, followed
by every “B” template, and so on. This enables the template
writer to have up to 26 passes across every node in the IR.
By processing templates in this way, the designer can ap-
proach model building iteratively. For example, a default set
of templates will generate an abstract, Linux container-based
experiment with no behavioral model. From this point, the
model designer can write templates specific to their experi-
ment, such as a template that generates Windows KVM-based
endpoints. In this case, the Windows template would be or-
dered before the default Linux container templates, and any
endpoints that matched on the template criteria (such as hav-
ing the metadata os=windows), would emit a Windows VM
configuration. The Windows template would then indicate
not to continue in this pass for this node. If the criteria do not
match, minemiter simply falls through to the next template, in
this case the default Linux container templates. By using this
approach, the model designer can both iterate on successively
higher fidelity models without having to modify the source
IR, as well as easily modify the level of abstraction in the
experiment by simply adding or removing key templates.
The templates are so flexible that different sets of templates
could even be used to generate models for different emulation
platforms. Alternatively, it may be simpler to transliterate
the discovery IR to whatever IR the other desired emulation
platforms supports.
6 SCinet 2016
During Supercomputing 2016, we worked to build a
discovery-based model of SCinet 2016 as NRE participants.
6.1 Router Configurations
Our first step to modeling SCinet was to parse the router con-
figurations in order to determine the structure of the network.
SCinet 2016 included five routers from four different vendors:
Arista, Brocade, Juniper, and Cisco. The parser for each con-
figuration file created a new node in the IR and created an
edge for each IP assigned to the router. The parsers inspect
the IP address and subnet assigned to each edge and connect
the edges that share the same subnet. We were only interested
in constructing a simple layer-3 model so we ignored other
configurations such as VLAN-tagging for certain interfaces.
Figure 4 shows a picture of the resulting IR.
6.2 dhcpd Logs
Once we had the structure of the network, we built a new
parser for dhcpd logs to populate the endpoints on the net-
work. We chose to use dhcpd logs for several reasons. First,
they include devices across many of the conference subnets.
Second, these logs are simple to parse. Third, they are small in
comparison to the terabytes of PCAP that we would otherwise
have to process to obtain the same information.
The parser scans the logs looking for DHCP acknowledge-
ments (ACK). ACKs are of the format:
DHCPACK on 140.221.X.Y to <MAC> \
(<HOSTNAME>) via 140.221.X.1
For each ACK, the parser queries the IR to see if it already
contains an endpoint with the given MAC and if it does not,
it creates one. It then updates the endpoint with the leased IP
address and hostname. This parser took only a few hours to
implement and run on the logs which demonstrates a strength
of the discovery toolset – adding new parsers is trivial.
Figure 1 shows a picture of the resulting IR, omitting the
two largest subnets: the wireless network and the classrooms.
These subnets make the graph too large to easily display. To
omit these subnets, we simply wrote a small trim tool that
walks the IR and marks nodes for deletion based on a query.
We ran this for each subnet, unmarked the nodes representing
routers, and then ran it again to delete the marked nodes.
The dhcpd logs that we processed contained a total of 9,525
endpoints. From the hostnames they request, we estimate that
there were at least 2,100 Android and 1,900 iPhone devices.
Another 500 were iPads and another 71 were Windows de-
vices. Based on this information, we changed the icon in the
visualization to show where the different OSes appear in the
network. Upon doing so, we discovered that one subnet is
entirely Windows devices.
6.3 Emulation
We took the resulting IR and used minemiter to create a min-
imega script to boot a Emulytics model of SCinet 2016. For
simplicity, the environment is based on the default templates –
all endpoints are represented with containers and all IPs were
statically assigned. The script contained over 128k minimega
commands and took just over 14 minutes to run, launching the
8,416 containers across 10 machines. When booting the con-
tainers, we discarded endpoints that had the same IP address
or the same hostname. These discarded endpoints suggest
improvements that we can make to our dhcpd parser – there
should be no duplicate IPs for the time that the DHCP lease
is valid and hostnames should be deduplicated by appending
an integer.
Figure 5 shows a screenshot of minimega’s network graph
which shows how the container networks connect in a running
minimega environment. From this network graph, we can see
a similar structure to the IR-based graphs shown in Figure 4
and Figure 1.
7 Discussion
We chose the simplest emulation for SCinet 2016: an all con-
tainer environment with static IP addresses. There are many
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Figure 4: Model based on router configurations that shows the many interconnections between the two aggregation routers, their
connections to the core routers, and finally the connections between the core routers and the conference router.
Figure 5: Screenshot of minimega’s network graph for SCinet
2016 model
ways in which we can improve the fidelity of the environment
using the IR and templates built into the toolset. However, an
open question is how much effort to put into improving the
emulation. For example, we could replace the containers with
KVM-based VMs and launch operating systems matching
those of the real devices but that may not provide any benefit
over an all container environment if we are only interested
in studying properties of a firewall or IDS appliance between
the registration network and the WiFi devices.
Furthermore, there is the question of how well our model
matches the real network. So far, we have compared graphs
from the Emulytics environment to the IR-based graphs and
the IR-based graphs to the SCinet network diagrams. A more
rigorous analysis of whether the Emulytics model matches
the IR model which, in turn, matches the real network, would
be required before claims about the real network could be
made using the Emulytics model. Fortunately, many of the
applications of Emulytics do not require this level of rigor.
For example, to continue with the previous example, studying
properties of a firewall or IDS appliance.
8 Future Work
To date, most of our efforts have been towards understanding
a static snapshot of the network we that wish to emulate. In
the real-world, networks evolve over time as when endpoints
are added, removed, or simply move to a different location
within the network. This evolution is particularly interesting
with laptops and mobile devices which have high mobility.
The templated model generation technique we employ
could be used to perform transforms on already running ex-
periments. For example, say source network data from a given
7
network is captured a day apart, and two IRs are created from
that data. The model generator can be used to create a “base”
model, representing the first data snapshot. Once the base
model is running, the model generator can use a separate set of
templates to determine the difference from the second model
(created from data taken a day later), and create Emulytics
platform commands to modify the booted model. This allows
creating temporal snapshots of experiments and modifying
experiments to reflect those temporal changes. Alternatively,
because our IR includes an unstructured map, we could also
annotate devices based on time and change our tools to be
aware of time. This may require significant changes to our
tools that currently expect uniqueness in fields such as MAC
address and IP address.
9 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented our discovery toolset which
aims to automate the map to model process for Emulytics.
The toolset contains a daemon that stores the IR and provides
a RESTful API for tools, parsers, and model generators to
communicate with. On the backend, we describe minemiter,
a tool that takes a template-based approach to generate com-
mands to instantiate a model of the network in an emulation
platform. We have applied our tools and techniques to model
SCinet 2016 which we booted in minimega.
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